10 ⵵, İ ؼ õų

  • + ã
  • 2026.05.27() 21:28
10 ⵵, İ ؼ õų
-⵵ , 硤 17 ñ ȸü 250 ȿ ó
- 10 Ը 50% δ ñ Ī ü ִ 400 100%
  • Է : 2026. 05.27() 12:12
õ
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[/CTN] = ⵵ ȯ濡 "ȿ á ½ǰ ȸü δ Ǹ, ε ȸü ȯ氳 ϰڴ" 簢 İ 庮 ϰڴٴ Ƿߴ. ⵵ ȣ ȿ , ѱ° ϺκΡ⺻ο 17 ñ ȸü 250 ó ϴ 'İ ؼ ü ó ' â ߴٰ .

̹ Ŀ ȸü ȯ ǽõ, ñ ü 踦 ⼺ Ȯƴ. ȸ, Ƿẹü, ΰֽü ٽ ü, ȿ Ű 100% ִ 400 ñ ɰ ϰ μ μ ϰڴٴ ħ .

ó ü ° 簢븦 ϰ ȸ 뼺 شȭϷ õ ο ƴϴ. ̴ ó ÷ ȭ յΰ Ը EERS ó ȭ ο ġ п ϸ Ϸ ߴ ġ ߽ Ѵ. ⵵ Ұ μ ñ â 'İ ؼ' õ 귣带 ߴµ, ̴ ȹ ǥ ǵ μ Ͽ Źͽ ȿ Ȯ ڴٴ Ǯ̵ȴ.

׷ ȹ ǥ ġ ٽ ϴ ̸鿡, ü ' ѵ ȭ ' 'ó ü ' ܸ ǰ 縮 ִ. Ϻ ü ܱ ̳ ġ Ϻ ΰ ü谡 ´ ó, ⵵ ̹ å '17 ñ ȸ '̶ ̺Ʈ ̴. ü ϴ ߰ ̳ ü ܿâȣ ȭ и ä ó ߽Ű ܱ ̺Ʈ ƴٴ ϱ ƴ. 279 8 4õ ߴ Ϳ ش 250 Ը پ, Ȳǿ ༭ ī Ȱȭ ִ ȫϴ å籹 ӹ 帮 ó.

⵵ ڷ ٷο ü ɻ Ż ȸ ü ģ ٺ ܿ ߽ ۿ뿡 ؼ ö Աϰ ִ. '3 30 '̶ ȫ ܿ ü Ƚϰ ü ̿ ֵ ϴ ü ̵ ߴ. ܼ ' 50% д'̶ ġ 'ִ 400 '̶ ŸƲ ο ü  忡 ߻ ִ ʱ ߸ ̴. ⵵ ֱ ġ ġ ϰ, ü ɸ ȿ Ȳ ϰ 䱸 ִ ִ ' Ŀ ü' ȭ ε Ǻη ִ ִ ġȡ Ͽ ؾ ̴.

[ -AIȰ]
Cha Sung-soo, Director-General of the Climate, Environment and Energy Bureau of Gyeonggi Province, declared, "The support for high-efficiency air conditioners and heaters is expected to reduce greenhouse gases and ease the financial burden on social welfare facilities. Moving forward, we will continue to make steady efforts to improve the energy welfare environment of social welfare facilities," emphasizing his strong commitment to preemptively block energy welfare blind spots and climate gap barriers in the jurisdiction. Gyeonggi Province announced that it launched the 'Climate Gap Resolution Welfare Facility Air Conditioner Support Project' counter in cooperation with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) Northern Gyeonggi and Gyeonggi Headquarters, targeting 250 social welfare facilities in 17 cities and counties, including Goyang and Yongin, to support high-efficiency climate appliance purchasing costs.

This project was conducted to improve the energy environment of social welfare facilities vulnerable to heatwaves and cold snaps, and the final direction was confirmed through task coordination based on demand surveys from each city and county. The targets of the inspection were core vulnerable facilities, including social welfare centers, elderly medical welfare facilities, and residential facilities for the disabled. The province intends to demonstrate an administrative posture by activating sustainable energy welfare restoration processes, touting its 100% coverage within a maximum support of 4 million KRW per facility and urging active interest and cooperation from KEPCO and respective municipalities.

The attempt by a government branch or local government-affiliated institution to mobilize public infrastructures to diagnose blind spots in the industrial ecosystem and maximize the social utility of public data is not a new phenomenon. It aligns with the historical pattern of performance-centered administration, where government agencies exposed available department budgets and brilliant numbers of participants all at once to the media right before large-scale EERS promotion policy agreements to prove visible administrative achievements. Gyeonggi Province also encouraged public officials in its subordinate departments to open an omnibus demand survey counter across 17 municipalities, building a refined brand called 'Climate Gap Resolution,' which is interpreted as an administrative move to solidify the efficiency of advanced energy data governance by linking the annual project announcement with internal review feedback processes.

However, behind the packaging of such a project launch as a core achievement of climate and safety administration lies a complacent bureaucratic convenience trying to wrap up performance with a trendy framework of regional allocations, while turning a blind eye to the 'aging power infrastructure fixation due to budget caps' and 'aggravated fixation of routine electricity bills after appliance replacement' that local field facilities actually face on-site. Just as some local governments or agencies held a few short seminars and made a show as if a perfect public-private win-win system was established, the current project of Gyeonggi Province merely emphasizes a process of 17 regional allocations. It is difficult to avoid criticism that it was close to a short-term event that left direct financial electricity subsidies from the province's budget or specific insulation and window regulation relaxation blocking infrastructure supplementation for local welfare facilities behind, while only aggravating administrative processing performance. In fact, compared to last year when 840 million KRW was spent for 279 facilities, the scale has rather decreased to 250 facilities this year. Broadcasting massive promotions as if all energy-vulnerable markets can be vitalized by gathering at the situation room for a few agreement card calculations misses the mark of the climate energy policy authority's inherent duty.

The climate administration keeps completely silent regarding field-centered negative side effects, such as the complicated facility review failure reasons of actual welfare fields after the press release or the low fundamental insulation improvement rates that ended in a one-off appliance exchange. The province also failed to present specific post-management guidelines to encourage vulnerable subjects to utilize the facilities with confidence, except for the mere promotion of a '3-year 30 billion KRW investment plan.' It was blinded only by the statistics of a 50% cost-sharing structure with KEPCO and the title record of maximum 4 million KRW support, missing prevention measures for risks such as failing early management settlement at the actual operational fields. Gyeonggi Province must refrain from showing-off event hosting competitions and annual performance politics, and concentrate its capabilities first on robust public order and welfare infrastructure supplementation, such as substantializing a 'field-linked permanent climate energy consultation body' where actual regional subjects and field experts can constantly inspect regulatory bottleneck degrees and energy efficiency statuses to adjust improvements directly so that enterprises and citizens can actually feel it.
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