ܱ, 3 й ī

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  • 2026.06.15() 14:34
ܱ, 3 й ī
-ܱ, 6 12 켭 Ρ ܹ 'ѹ 繫 ̻ȸ'
-̿ Ϲ̱塤Ϸ ī ǰ Ⱥ÷ܱ Ȳ
  • Է : 2026. 06.15() 10:34
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[ܱ/CTN] = ܱδ ޺ϴ ۷ι Ⱥ ӿ 3 å 㺸ϱ 6 12 쿡 ̱ , Ϻ ܹ 'ѹ 繫 ̻ȸ' ߴٰ ǥߴ.

̹ ̻ȸ ̿ Ϲ̱ ̺ Ϸ , ī հ Ϻ ܹ ƽþƴֱ ǰ 3 ܱ Ⱥ ٽ ǹ ߴ. ڵ Ⱥ Ⱥ, ÷ܱ ޸ ٺȭ о߿ Ȳ ߴ. Ư ü ġ 3 ü踦 ȭϱ ٽ ⱸ '繫'  üȭϴ , ε ϻ󿡼 ü ִ ܱ ϱ ļ ε ߴ. ƿ﷯ ߿ ϱ ѹ ǵ Ǿ, ֱ ѹݵ 򰡸 ϰ ȭ ǥ Ⱥ Ȯߴ. 츮 ȭ ŷ ܱ , 3 ѹݵ ȭ ȣϱ ٰ ߴ.

̡ б ϡ ٱȭ Ⱥ ӿ ѹ 3 ܼ ؿ ʰ, '繫 ̻ȸ' ǹ ⱸ 쿡 ܱ Ӽ Ȯߴٴ 򰡵ȴ. Ư Ⱥ Ѿ ÷ܱ Ⱥ ƿ츣 Ȳ ϰ, ' ü ' ü ̵ ܱ ǸǸ شȭϷ ȸ δ.

׷ ̷ ѹ 繫 ܱ (Rhetoric) ȸü 꿡 ġ ʱ ؼ, ̻ ̳ ޸ ǽð ۵ ִ ' Ŵ(Post-Manual)' 󸶳 ϰ ϺϴĿ ޷ ִٴ ȴ. 3 ȭ Ⱥ ̶ 常 Ź Ǯ , Ͼ ޺ ġ ذ ż Ѵٸ 繫̶ DZ ʻ̱ ̴. ѱ ܱδ ȸ Ŀ ̱Ϻ ǹ ϴ ֶ ϰ, 簢븦 ޿ ļ ġ ֵؾ Ѵ. ư ѹ ʷ ִ ð ְ ؾ߸, ȭ ̶ Ϻϰ ȣ ̴.

[ -AIȰ]
Lee Won-woo, Director-General for North American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who charges the practical axis of the ROK-US-Japan trilateral alliance, held serial meetings with high-ranking officials of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs separate from the closely-watched meeting, and exchanged in-depth opinions on various current issues including the ROK-US and US-Japan alliances. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it held the 'ROK-US-Japan Secretariat Steering Committee' in Tokyo on June 12 in cooperation with the US Department of State and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure close policy coordination and execution power among the three nations amid the rapidly changing global security landscape.

The steering committee was attended by core diplomatic security practical lines of the three nations, including Director-General Lee Won-woo, David Wilezol, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Japan and Korea at the US Department of State, and Otsuka Kengo, Deputy Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Participants comprehensively reviewed the implementation status of ongoing cooperative projects not only in traditional security sectors but also in diversified fields such as economic security and advanced technology supply chains. In particular, they materialized the operation plans of the 'Secretariat,' a core organ to institutionalize the trilateral cooperative system regardless of regime shifts or political variables, while discussing concrete roadmaps to derive visible diplomatic achievements that citizens of each country can perceive in daily lives. Concurrently, a separate ROK-US-Japan consultation was deployed on the same day to respond to North Korea's military provocations, sharing assessments on the recent Korean Peninsula situation and reaffirming the goal of complete denuclearization and efforts to implement UN Security Council resolutions. The South Korean side explained its diplomatic efforts to ease inter-Korean tensions and build trust, and the three nations exchanged opinions on cooperative methods to protect the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Amid multifold security crises such as US-China hegemony competitions and North Korea-Russia alignment, the move where the ROK-US-Japan trilateral alliance did not stop its cooperation level at simple joint declarations but officially operated a permanent practical organ called the 'Secretariat Steering Committee' in Tokyo is evaluated as a remarkable achievement in terms of securing diplomatic continuity. In particular, reviewing comprehensive implementation status encompassing advanced technologies and overall economic security beyond security alliances, and presenting a concrete guideline of 'citizen-perceived achievements,' highlights diplomatic pragmatism.

However, critics point out that for these efforts to settle the ROK-US-Japan secretariat system to avoid ending up as simple diplomatic rhetoric and proliferation of bureaucratic meetings, it depends on how meticulously they complete a 'crisis response post-manual' capable of operating in real-time during emergencies such as North Korean missile provocations or supply chain disruptions. This is because if the three nations merely repeat theoretical stances of complete denuclearization and implementation of Security Council resolutions every time, but fail to unfold rapid joint fronts due to each nation's political interests when Northeast Asian situations shift rapidly, the secretariat infrastructure can easily become useless. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs must build a digital security hotline constantly connecting practical staffs of the US and Japan even after the Tokyo meeting, and lead substantial follow-up measures to fill the blind spots of sanctions against North Korea. Furthermore, only when post-political administrations capable of managing excessive cooling of ROK-China relations that ROK-US-Japan alignment may cause are balanced will it be able to perfectly protect national interests of regional peace and stability.
gyj1119@naver.com
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