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̹ ÿ ū û ڶϴ ' ȯ濡 Ȯ' 䱸(ROC) äõDZ ξ ' ¿ ǥ' ӹ ִٴ ̴. ΰ ݻü(RCWS) 浹 δ 䱸 Ϸ ȭ Ĺ ȯ濡 ٿȭ ʼӿ, Ϸ¥ ÿȸ ұ ü ٷ ̷ ó ȣϴ ´ ɸ ü ̴. ұ ߰ ϰ ߴٸ, ȸ Ʒ ƴ϶ ÿ ǰ 'żӽùȹ' ﰢ ϰ, ұ ü ǰ ȭ ȭϴ Ǿ ߴ.
ƿ 롤ұ ݼ ȭϰڴٴ 籹 ų ȸ ݺǴ Ư ̴. ñ âϸ鼭, ұ ȿ ؼ ݵ ̳ ȿ ִ Ȧ Ź å ɼ 鿡 ̴.
Ⱥ ° ڸ ȭΰ ô뿡 籹 ü å ܼ Ʒ ս ڶ ڷ ġ Ѿ ϴ. ų ݺǴ ü ÿ ȸ ȫ ϴ δ ұ 濵 ҾȰ ϼ 庴 õ ؼ . û ÿȸ Ǽ ġ ȫϴ ֱ ﰢ ߴؾ Ѵ. ״ 忡 ȭ ϴ Ҿü ȹ ȿɰ ֵ 밡 ý ȭϰ, ü ϵ ȣ ϴ ¼ ؾ ü ̴.
[ -AIȰ]
Jeong Jae-jun, head of the Advanced Capability Program Department at the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), stated, "This demonstration is part of an effort to move away from paperwork-centered administration, directly verify anti-drone technologies applicable to maneuver weapon systems in the field, and swiftly link excellent technologies with actual deployment." This is a passage highlighting the central agency leader's willpower and administrative achievements, directly visiting the Pocheon Seungjin Training Field to inspect defense technology protecting tanks and armored vehicles against small drones—a threat that has recently surged in modern warfare—and emphasizing the department's preemptive procurement management capabilities. The blueprints filling the press release, such as listing technological dimensions of soft-kill and hard-kill and quantitative figures indicating that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) accounted for over 80% of participating companies, create an illusion as if DAPA is leading tremendous innovation in advanced national defense to solidify the K-defense ecosystem and military weapon system innovation. However, despite the fact that the substance of the administration stops at a one-off demonstration event inviting high-ranking military officials to watch drone downing performances, the practice of trying to package a regular department technology investigation project into a special advanced security innovation achievement by hiding behind the grand rhetoric of "swift linkage with actual deployment" is a specimen of typical performance-inflating exhibition administration.
The biggest blind spot of this technological demonstration is that the 'verification and data acquisition in a real-world-like environment' boasted by the Administration stays as an 'evasive reward sheet for show' that is woefully insufficient to be officially adopted as a standard military weapon after undergoing strict military Required Operational Capability (ROC) verifications and meticulous performance evaluations. For innovative technologies like artificial intelligence-based Remote Controlled Weapon Stations (RCWS) or direct-collision drones to meet the operational capability requirements of frontline units, cross-verification under severe weather or complex jamming environments is essential. Yet, attempting to portray as if the entry of SMEs into the prime contractor supply chain will happen immediately based on a single-day demonstration is nothing more than a performance-oriented shell commonly used by central agencies caught in performance anxiety. If it truly desires to lower the barrier for SMEs in the defense market and construct a robust anti-drone safety net, instead of expending administrative power on showy tours of training fields, solid infrastructure solidifying must precede, such as drastically expanding the budget linked to 'Rapid Demonstration Acquisition Projects' for excellent demonstrated products and streamlining the localization certification process for independent SME components.
In addition, the official promise to accelerate mutual growth between large and small enterprises is also an exhibition-style inertia administration peculiar to bureaucracy repeated every defense exhibition. Although it claims this is an urgent task based on the lessons of the Russia-Ukraine war, desk administration that slights the establishment of a permanent safety net—such as permanent fund creation or long-term purchase guarantees to relieve the chronic financial shortage and budget execution inefficiency suffered by defense SMEs—only invites criticism in terms of policy sustainability.
In an era where national defense security and the independence of the defense ecosystem have become topics for national survival, the weapon system policies of authorities must move beyond press release politics centered on simple training field demonstration performances or superficial enterprise count bragging for show. Expending public funds every year on repeated exhibition-like demonstration operation costs and one-off publicity cannot fundamentally relieve the deep business anxieties of small defense firms and safety anxieties of frontline soldiers facing drone threats. DAPA must immediately stop exhibition administration promoting demonstration hosting counts as achievements. Upgrading transparent technology cost estimation systems so that small firms silently dedicating themselves to technology localization in shaded development fields can enjoy practical procurement welfare efficacy, and fully reorganizing subcontracting protection safety nets with prime systems, it should concentrate administrative capabilities on solidifying the inherent public support and reception posture to receive recognition for the sincerity of policy.
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gyj1119@naver.com
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2026.06.05() 19:22
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